We give a general framework for the treatment of perturbations of types and structures in continuous logic, allowing to specify which parts of the logic may be perturbed. We prove that separable, elementarily equivalent structures which are approximately $aleph_0$-saturated up to arbitrarily small perturbations are isomorphic up to arbitrarily small perturbations. As a corollary, we obtain a Ryll-Nardzewski style characterisation of complete theories all of whose separable models are isomorphic up to arbitrarily small perturbations.

We present an adaptation of continuous first order logic to unbounded metric structures. This has the advantage of being closer in spirit to C. Ward Henson's logic for Banach space structures than the unit ball approach, as well as of applying in situations where the unit ball approach does not apply. We also introduce the process of single point emph{emboundment}, allowing to bring unbounded structures back into the setting of bounded continuous first order logic. Together with results from cite{BenYaacov:Perturbations} regarding (...) perturbations of bounded metric structures, we prove a Ryll-Nardzewski style characterisation of theories of Banach spaces which are separably categorical up to small perturbation of the norm. This last result is motivated by an unpublished result of Henson. (shrink)

Continuous first-order logic has found interest among model theorists who wish to extend the classical analysis of “algebraic” structures to various natural classes of complete metric structures. With research in continuous first-order logic preoccupied with studying the model theory of this framework, we find a natural question calls for attention. Is there an interesting set of axioms yielding a completeness result?The primary purpose of this article is to show that a certain, interesting set of axioms does indeed yield a completeness (...) result for continuous first-order logic. In particular, we show that in continuous first-order logic a set of formulae is satisfiable if it is consistent. From this result it follows that continuous first-order logic also satisfies an approximated form of strong completeness, whereby Σ⊨φ only if Σ⊢φ∸ 2-n for all n < ω. This approximated form of strong completeness asserts that if Σ⊨φ, then proofs from Σ, being finite, can provide arbitrarily better approximations of the truth of φ.Additionally, we consider a different kind of question traditionally arising in model theory—that of decidability. When is the set of all consequences of a theory recursive? Say that a complete theory T is decidable if for every sentence φ, the value φT is a recursive real, and moreover, uniformly computable from φ. If T is incomplete, we say it is decidable if for every sentence φ the real number φT∘ is uniformly recursive from φ, where φT∘is the maximal value of φ consistent with T. As in classical first-order logic, it follows from the completeness theorem of continuous first-order logic that if a complete theory admits a recursive axiomatization then it is decidable. (shrink)

-/- Continuous first-order logic has found interest among model theorists who wish to extend the classical analysis of “algebraic” structures (such as fields, group, and graphs) to various natural classes of complete metric structures (such as probability algebras, Hilbert spaces, and Banach spaces). With research in continuous first-order logic preoccupied with studying the model theory of this framework, we find a natural question calls for attention. Is there an interesting set of axioms yielding a completeness result? -/- The primary purpose (...) of this article is to show that a certain, interesting set of axioms does indeed yield a completeness result for continuous first-order logic. In particular, we show that in continuous first-order logic a set of formulae is (completely) satisfiable if (and only if) it is consistent. From this result it follows that continuous first-order logic also satisfies an approximated form of strong completeness, whereby Σ⊧φ (if and) only if Σ⊢φ ∸2−n for all n < ω. This approximated form of strong completeness asserts that if Σ⊧φ, then proofs from Σ, being finite, can provide arbitrarily better approximations of the truth of φ. -/- Additionally, we consider a different kind of question traditionally arising in model theory—that of decidability. When is the set of all consequences of a theory (in a countable, recursive language) recursive? Say that a complete theory T is decidable if for every sentence φ, the value φ T is a recursive real, and moreover, uniformly computable from φ. If T is incomplete, we say it is decidable if for every sentence φ the real number φ T o is uniformly recursive from φ, where φ T o is the maximal value of φ consistent with T. As in classical first-order logic, it follows from the completeness theorem of continuous first-order logic that if a complete theory admits a recursive (or even recursively enumerable) axiomatization then it is decidable. (shrink)

We point out how the "Fundamental Theorem of Stability Theory", namely the equivalence between the "non order property" and definability of types, proved by Shelah in the 1970s, is in fact an immediate consequence of Grothendieck's "Criteres de compacite" from 1952. The familiar forms for the defining formulae then follow using Mazur's Lemma regarding weak convergence in Banach spaces.

We develop several aspects of local and global stability in continuous first order logic. In particular, we study type-definable groups and genericity.

We prove that for every simple theory $T$ (or even simple thick compact abstract theory) there is a (unique) compact abstract theory $T^fP$ whose saturated models are the lovely pairs of $T$. Independence-theoretic results that were proved in [Ben Yaacov, Pillay, Vassiliev - Lovely pairs of models] when $T^fP$ is a first order theory are proved for the general case: in particular $T^fP$ is simple and we characterise independence.

If ${\mathfrak {F}}$ is a type-definable family of commensurable subsets, subgroups or subvector spaces in a metric structure, then there is an invariant subset, subgroup or subvector space commensurable with ${\mathfrak {F}}$. This in particular applies to type-definable or hyper-definable objects in a classical first-order structure.

Given a continuous and isometric action of a Polish group G on an adequate Polish topometric space $(X,\tau,\rho )$ and $x \in X$, we find a necessary and sufficient condition for $\overline {Gx}^{\rho }$ to be co-meagre; we also obtain a criterion that characterizes when such a point exists. This work completes a criterion established in earlier work of the authors.

We prove that the definition of supersimplicity in metric structures from [Ben Yaacov, Uncountable dense categoricity in cats] is equivalent to an textit{a priori} stronger variant. This stronger variant is then used to prove that if $T$ is a supersimple Hausdorff cat then so is its theory of lovely pairs.

For a locally compact group G, we show that it is possible to present the class of continuous unitary representations of G as an elementary class of metric structures, in the sense of continuous logic. More precisely, we show how nondegenerate ∗-representations of a general ∗-algebra A (with some mild assumptions) can be viewed as an elementary class, in a many-sorted language, and use the correspondence between continuous unitary representations of G and nondegenerate ∗-representations of L1(G). We relate the notion (...) of ultraproduct of logical structures, under this presentation, with other notions of ultraproduct of representations appearing in the literature, and we characterize property (T) for G in terms of the definability of the sets of fixed points of L1 functions on G. (shrink)